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Good management
or good finances?
An agent-based study on
the causes of bank failure
Abstraсt
The recent series of banking crises in the United States and in the Eurozone has resulted in numerous bank failures. In this paper, an agent-based model is employed to test
for factors that determine bank viability in times of distress, focusing mainly on the endogenous risk of financial institutions. The authors test for the effects of both management and financial factors on the institutions’ ability to weather the storm during times
when the banking system experiences distress. The agent-based simulation process is
split into a setup period, when the simulation builds the structural characteristics of
each bank, and a testing period, where these characteristics are tested against the final
result, which is the bank’s viability. A risk estimation model is built and it is found that
the proposed model is successful in predicting whether a particular bank can endure
a stress testing situation. The empirical results confirm the relevant literature and put
further emphasis on the policy implications regarding banking supervision and regulation, particularly in context of the Eurozone banking union.

Keywords

corporate governance, agent-based finance, endogenous
risk, bank management

JEL Classification

G01, G32, G21, G28, H3

INTRODUCTION
The world banking system has vivid memories from the financial turmoil of 2008, where several financial institutions were faced with extremely strenuous conditions. The 2008 crisis extended beyond the
financial sector, hurting total output and thus damaging societal prosperity. Researchers still attempt to locate the distinguishing characteristics of banks, which allowed some to recover from the crisis and
drove others to default. Most argue that there must exist a set of traits,
ranging from sound management to solid finances, that would permit
a forecast of the ability of a bank to weather the storm during distress.
In this paper, an agent-based model is employed in order to examine
the causes of bank distress. It is proposed that banks fail due to both financial and corporate governance factors and introduce these features
in the authors modelling platform. The authors of the current article
attempt a link between these characteristics of the financial institution and its final state at the end of the simulation and employ this link
to develop a simple forecasting model, verifying its robustness.

This is an Open Access article,
distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International license,
which permits re-use, distribution,
and reproduction, provided the
materials aren’t used for commercial
purposes and the original work is
properly cited.

The current paper contributes to three aspects of the existing literature. Firstly, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, it is the first effort to
utilize an agent-based modelling platform as the medium with which
to carry out simulations in the fields of management and corporate
governance. Secondly, the validity of the results of existing literature
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on the causes of bank failure is tested. Thirdly, possible policy implications are examined with respect
to banking supervision, especially in the context of protecting societal prosperity.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 1 presents the relevant literature. In Section 2, the agentbased model is discussed and its main points are briefly presented. Section 3 includes the methodological issues of the research work and the variables used. In Section 4, the outcome of the simulations is
presented and the last Section includes the concluding remarks.

1. LITERATURE REVIEW
There exists a new trend in academic research that
has turned the focus on modelling bank survivability as opposed to profitability, which was the
favored topic before the financial crisis of 2008.
Existing studies mainly examine risk and risk
management and have linked these to the financial characteristics of banks. Philippas et al. (2015)
implement the SIR1 epidemiological model in an
effort to predict the final state of a bank during a
banking crisis. Haq and Heaney (2012) find a significant negative relationship between total banking risk and the dividend payout ratio, which they
attribute to the effort of banking firms to increase
income for their shareholders. Broll et al. (2015)
also attempt to model the relationship between
risk and return in banking institutions.

with firm maturity. Barr et al. (1993) also demonstrate that management quality is closely linked
with bank survivability. Sullivan and Spong (2007)
show that insider wealth limits risk-taking behavior, whereas stock ownership by hired managers
may increase risk. Additionally, wealth concentration, which is the proportion of one’s wealth at risk
in a given financial institution, was also showed to
have a positive effect on risk management (lower
total risk), provided that the individual is in a position to influence relevant managerial decisions
(Iannotta et al., 2007). Konishi and Yasuda (2004)
examine the Japanese banking sector and reach
similar conclusions, establishing a nonlinear empirical relationship of stable ownership and banking risk. García-Marco and Robles-Fernández
(2008) corroborate these findings for the Spanish
market.

Note that some researchers make the case that
greater risk-taking can be in the best interest of
shareholders in the presence of deposit insurance
(Beltratti & Stulz, 2009). Caluzzo and Dong (2015)
suggest that risk in the financial sector has shifted
away from individual risk towards systemic risk,
adding that banking systems are now more susceptible to systemic contagion (as opposed to contagion in the banking system). Simper et al. (2015)
also show that risk management practices play an
important part in bank performance.

Kangis and Kareklis (2001) demonstrate that the
mix between public and private ownership can
have an effect on bank performance. Barry et al.
(2011), and Haque and Shahid (2016) also confirm
the results showing the important role of ownership structure, especially for privately owned
banks, where institutional investors tend to implement riskier strategies when owning higher stakes
in banks. Wu and Li (2015) examine Chinese
firms and comment positively on the effects of
board independence on firm performance, while
Kaur Virk (2017) shows that board independence
Contrary to existing research on bank perfor- is linked with a smaller number of regulatory viomance and viability, this paper expands to the lations. Laeven and Levine (2009) and Mullineux
field of management and additionally includes (2006) also stress the importance of regulation.
corporate governance features. Macey and O’Hara
(2003) provide a thorough review of corporate gov- Williams and Nguyen (2005) implement the
ernance in the banking sector and its implications technical inefficiency effects model of Battese
on the financial institutions and on the econom- and Coelli (1995) using bank governance variaic system as a whole. O’Connor and Byrne (2015) bles, similar to ours. This methodology was emshow that “sound” corporate governance is linked ployed in the current article in order to implement
1
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a risk-governance index in the authors model,
which describes bank features that tend to show
“sound” management strategies. Additionally,
Gupta et al. (2013) employ an additive index to
quantify forty two bank governance factors. They
find that corporate governance “failed” during
the financial crisis, since the factors that existing
literature considered as positive did little to help
large corporations. A similar index is constructed
by Koerniadi et al. (2014), who find that good governance practices are associated with lower levels
of risk. Agoraki et al. (2010) link board size and
composition to bank efficiency, suggesting that a
small board size may signify better risk management. Similar results are demonstrated in Conyon
and Peck (1998), who find that a smaller board size
results in better corporate performance.

al., 2018) and has also been applied to the Greek
banking system (Samitas & Polyzos, 2015).

The model incorporates three main types of economic agents, namely Banks, Households and
Firms. These agents operate under a given supervisory framework, which is set forth by a market
regulator. In this setup, there is a constant, but
not unconditional, flow of funds between these
agents, which can take place in various ways,
ranging from the exchange of financial goods between banks and their customers to the payment
of wages from firms to households. Firms operate
and improve their productive capacity using financing from the banking system, which draws
liquidity from the funds of depositors. The model also employs the idea that agents can go bankrupt. Bankruptcy occurs when agents are unable
ElKelish (2017) performs a multi-country analy- to meet their financial obligations. The insolvensis of corporate governance risks, linking them to cy conditions are stricter for banks than they are
agency costs. Similarly, Aebi et al. (2012) propose for other agents and, naturally, the consequences
a series of measures of corporate governance that are different as well. The model supports various
are better suited to the banking sector. They use methods of handling banks in distress, including
empirical data from banks in Europe and in the the bail-in solution, which was implemented to reUS and find that independent risk management is solve the 2013 Cyprus financial crisis.
crucial to the bank’s performance during a financial crisis. On the other hand, standard governance indicators seem to contribute little, if at all, 3. METHODS
to the amelioration of these results. However, they
note the negative effects of risk governance on per- A thorough description of the latest version of the
formance during “normal” times, using common model, including a formal model definition, can
performance indicators for the banking sector. be found in Samitas et al. (2018). In the current
Reddy and Locke (2014) reach similar conclusions paper, this work is extended, in order to modfrom data regarding firms in New Zealand.
el the risk of financial institutions according to
both their financial and their corporate governance characteristics. Each of the governance fea2. GENERAL MODEL
tures influences the bank’s behaviour in a different manner; this is something that the agent-based
DESCRIPTION
nature of the authors model allows to implement.
The agent-based financial model employed was The financial features are calculated at a snapshot
developed by Samitas and Polyzos (2015) and ex- of the financial institution after some time peritended by Polyzos and Samitas (2015). The mod- ods have elapsed. It must be noted that the proel was designed to simulate the behavior of eco- posed methodology does not examine bank pernomic agents and is loosely based on the work of formance, efficiency or profitability. At the current
Tsomocos (2003a, 2003b). However, the Tsomocos stage, these are not handled by the extension of
model was extended to include agent-based char- the model, since the goal was to examine the causacteristics, which are a new trend often seen in es of failure, rather than the causes of success.
simulation research (see for example Bookstaber
et al., 2018, and Riccetti et al., 2015). The specif- Extending the Samitas et al. (2018) model, specific agent-based model has also been used to sim- ic characteristics have been introduced for each
ulate the post-Brexit economic system (Samitas et bank. These variables are monitored in order to
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link them with the end state of each financial institution and to try to deduce an underlying relationship. In terms of governance features, the first
monitored variable in the simulation is the presence of a Credit Risk Officer (CRO) in the executive board. Aebi et al. (2012) suggest that when the
CRO has an active say in the executive board, this
generally results in better risk management. In the
current implementation, the bank is more capable
of discerning the probability of firms to default
on their loans. Additionally, banks with a CRO in
the board of directors have the capacity to offer financing at customized interest rates, according to
the credit status of the borrower2.

owned by the CEO4, the percentage owned by the
public sector and the percentage owned by institutional investors. It has been shown (Barry et al.,
2011) that institutional investors tend to enforce
riskier strategies when their ownership percent
permits them to exert managerial control. On the
other hand, Barry et al. also show that public sector ownership is associated with lower risk, while
other research (Iannotta et al., 2007) suggests lower loan quality and higher insolvency. Ownership
concentration is associated with better risk management (Iannotta et al., 2007), while a high CEO
ownership seems to reduce overall risk (Sullivan &
Spong, 2007).

Another variable implemented is the board size. The monitored financial variables include the
Aebi et al. (2012) and Beltratti and Stulz (2009) bank’s ratio of assets to liabilities5 and the ratio of
show that a smaller board size can work in the loans to deposits as shown below:
benefit of flexibility allowing the bank to respond
Amta ,t =10
a∈ Ab ,t =10
, (1)
faster to changing market conditions. Both stud- Assets to Liabilities b =
Amtl ,t =10
ies propose the use of further measures regarding
l∈Lb ,t =10
the Board of Directors, such as the attendance of
members to board meetings, but these were not Loans to Deposits b =
included in the authors simulations. However, if
∑ a ∈A Amta,t =10
=
. (2)
the board size
is too small, it is possible that the
Amt
where
l
is
of
type
Deposit
∑
,
10
=
l
t
l ∈L
lack of polyphony will hinder effective risk management. In the proposed model, a large board
size has a negative effect on the ability of the bank In terms of the bank’s position in the marketplace,
to offer the appropriate interest rate for each firm the ratio of the average interest rate of deposits
and to set its base deposit rate, which effects both and the ratio of the average interest rate of loans
over the market average were computed.
its cost of capital and its earnings3.

∑
∑

b ,t

b ,t

The board independence, which is the percentage of board members without further relation
to the bank, is also an implemented variable.
Additionally, a variable measuring the director
experience has been included, which is calculated
as the number of directors in the board with financial background. Aebi et al. (2012) have implemented this variable as the percentage of directors
with experience as an executive officer in a bank or
insurance company. Both these variables tend to
improve risk management as they increase.
In terms of ownership, three variables have been
included, namely the percentage of total equity
2
3
4
5
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b ,t =10

b ,t =10

Average Interest Rate ( Loans )b =

∑

× Amt

ir

=
a ,t 10
a∈ Ab ,t =10 a ,t 10=

=

∑

a∈ Ab ,t =10

Amta ,t =10

Market Average

(3)

.

Average Interest Rate ( Deposits )b =

∑

ir

× Amt

=
a ,t 10=
ba ,t 10
l∈L

=

b ,t =10

∑

l∈Lb ,t =10

Amtba ,t =10

Market Average

(4)

,

where l is of type Deposit.

See step 1.12 of the basic model, where the active firms seek financing from banks from their proposed investment projects.
This is handled at step 1.11 of the basic model.
CEO: Chief Executive Officer.
Note that this ratio will differ greatly from the expected values of a real-world bank, since the authors are only simulating part of a financial
institution’s balance sheet.
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Also, the model uses the average spread (denoted
by the average interest rate of loans minus that of
deposits) and the profit margin, which is the average interest rate of loans less the WACC6. The latter
is the weighted average of the interest rates of the
bank’s liabilities.
=
Average Spread b
−

∑

b ,t =10

∑

a∈ Ab ,t =10

ira ,t 10=
× Amtba ,t 10
∑=
l∈L
b ,t =10

∑

l∈Lb ,t =10

× Amt

ir

a ,t 10=
a ,t 10
=
a∈ A

−

Amta ,t =10

(5)

,

Amtba ,t =10

where l is of type Deposit.
Profit Marginb
=
−

∑

∑

∑

a∈ Ab ,t =10

l∈Lb ,t =10

Amta ,t =10

−

× Amt

ir

ba ,t 10
=
l∈Lb ,t =10 a ,t 10=

∑

× Amt

ir

a ,t 10
=
a∈ Ab ,t =10 a ,t 10=

Amtba ,t =10

After the implementation of these variables in the
proposed agent-based model, a virtual economy is
designed, consisting of 1,000 households, 10 banks
and 40 firms. Basel III was enforced as a regulatory framework for the banking system and a bail-in
was the solution of choice for the Regulator to save
a bank in distress. The time span for each simulation was 30 periods and 10,000 simulations were
executed.

(6)
.

The governance features were assigned to each
bank at the start of the simulation. Their values
are random and the probability distribution has
been manipulated to follow the findings of Aebi
et al. (2012), who recorded these variables over a
large sample of international banks. Each bank is
logged in the system with these variables at the
start of each simulation. The financial variables
were recorded at period 10, when the banks had
enough time to interact with firms and households, in order to build their asset and liability list.
The final state of the bank was then recorded, given four alternatives, as follows:

Note that equations 5 and 6 differ in the fact the
latter takes into account all liabilities of the bank
(i.e. includes interbank loans), while the former •
only considers deposits.

With respect to the particulars of the banking sector, the authors monitor the amount of cash over
the weighted assets7, the percentage of non-per- •
forming loans on total loans and the interbank exposure of the bank, which is the percentage of interbank loans over on loans. Increased interbank
exposure has been shown to deteriorate a bank’s
expected viability due to increased contagion •
risks (Drehmann & Tarashev, 2013).

CashtoWeighted Assetsb =

CBb ,t =10
wab ,t =10

(7)

,

•

NPLsb =
=

∑

a '∈ Ab ,t =10

Amta ',t =10 where a′has missed payments

∑

a∈ Ab ,t =10

Amta ,t =10

,

(8)

Interbank Exposureb =

∑

suchthat a′ ∈ L

Amt

=
a ',t 10=
b′,t 10
a '∈ A

=

6
7

b ,t =10

∑

a∈ Ab ,t =10

Amta ,t =10

b′ ∈ B
. (9)

Bankrupt: In this state, the bank has gone
bankrupt. Note that in this case, the Regulator
was unable to rescue the bank, using the deposits the bank carries.
Needs financing: In this state, the bank is still
working but is unable to meet the requirements of the regulatory framework and will
need a cash injection.
Balanced: This is the initial state of the bank.
This state will be assigned to banks in all cases where they cannot be included in any other
state.
Prosperous: This is the ideal state of the bank.
In this case, the bank’s total assets including
its available cash exceed its liabilities. This
state is an indication that the bank is well
equipped to deal with financial distress.

The final state of the bank is the dependent variable on the regression analysis proposed by the
authors. It was examined which of the above var-

Weighted Average Cost of Capital.
This could be considered an approximation to the Tier-1 capital.
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Table 1. Summaries of monitored variables for each final state
Bankrupt, %

Needs financing, %

Balanced, %

Prosperous, %

No CRO in board

66.0

61.0

53.0

53.0

CRO in board

34.0

39.0

47.0

47.0

12 (8/4)

13 (8/5)

13 (9/4)

13 (9/4)

CEO ownership

20.5

23.7

25.2

25.2

Public ownership

28.6

28.1

37.2

30.5
24.3

Board size (independent/dependent members)

Institutional ownership

20.9

23.2

22.6

Assets to liabilities

1,221

1,098

73

691

Loans to deposits

3,702

2,165

156

1,494

Deposit rate to market average

101.8

97.4

93.7

93.9

Loan rate to market average

102.3

97.2

94.2

95.3

Spread

6.41

5.95

5.88

5.91

Profit margin

5.28

5.42

5.58

5.42

Non-performing loans

9.88

15.38

1.59

9.16

Interbank exposure

28.7

54.4

1.4

39.3

Cash to weighted assets

25.6

24.6

36.1

31.8

Note: This table includes the summaries of monitored variable of the simulation set, for each of the final states of banks. The
summary for the CRO variables is the percentage of the banks where the particular feature was true, except for the board size,
which shows the average number of members. The summaries for the financial variables, as well as of ownership variables (CEO
ownership, public ownership and institutional ownership) represent the average values recorded at the snapshot period (period
10), linked with the end state of the bank after the end of the simulation.

iables are significant in the prediction of the final
state and a forecasting model was built to predict
the outcome of the simulations. This methodology
is similar to Aebi et al. (2012), the difference being
that the data is generated from the simulations of
the model. Following this process, the model was
executed again to verify its predictive efficiency.
The results are presented in the following section.

patterns for each of the variables over the entire
sample of 100,000 observations, according to the
final states. The table is indicative of the firm link
between the bank’s final state and both its governance and financial features.

Firstly, it is clear that CRO presence improves the
bank’s final state, since the worse-off states show
lower average CRO presence in the board of directors (Figure 1). The board size does not seem
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
important in determining the final state, but it
seems that an increased number of independent
Table 1 shows a summary of the monitored varia- members is beneficial (Figure 2).
bles for each of the four final states. The sample is
100,000 banks (10,000 simulations with 10 banks In terms of the ownership structure, it is evident
each) with random governance features, as de- that a larger value in CEO ownership as well as in
scribed earlier. This table shows the distribution institutional ownership will tend to improve the
100%
80%
60%
40%

20%
0%

Bankrupt

Needs financing
No CRO in board

Balanced
CRO in board

Figure 1. CRO presence for each of the four final states

100

Prosperous
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14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0

Bankrupt

Needs financing
Independent members

Balanced

Prosperous

Dependent members

Figure 2. Dependent and independent board members for each of the four states
40%
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%

Bankrupt

Needs financing
CEO ownership

Public ownership

Balanced

Prosperous

Institutional ownership

Figure 3. Average ownership percentages for each of the final states
104%
102%
100%
98%
96%
94%
92%
90%
88%

Bankrupt

Needs financing

Deposit rate to market average

Balanced

Prosperous

Loan rate to market average

Figure 4. Interest rates over the respective market average
bank’s future. On the other hand, greater public
ownership seems to lead the bank to the balanced
state more often, which is an expected result, since
publicly owned banks tend to exhibit lower risk
and lower profitability. The latter variable (public
ownership) does not seem to exhibit a linear relationship with the dependent variable (final state).

all states except the balanced state. It must also
be noted that the amount of loans that bankrupt
banks carry in their asset list is substantially higher than the other states. However, the existence of
extreme values in the prosperous state leads us to
deduce that banks cannot prosper if risks are not
assumed. Nevertheless, it must be made clear to
investors and depositors that these risks may reMoving on to financial information, it is impor- sult in bank failure. Risks must also be assumed
tant to note the existence of “extreme” values for by the financing department, where interestingly
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Table 2. Linear regression model for the prediction of the final state of the bank
(Constant)
CRO in board
Loans to deposits
Public ownership
Institutional ownership
CEO ownership
Deposit rate to average
Loan rate to average

B

Standard error

–1.82
0.65
–0.02
–0.28
0.32
0.19
–0.15
–0.36

0.018
0.006
0.000
0.012
0.013
0.013
0.014
0.029

Note: The model’s R2 value is 0.62, which means that an important proportion of the variance in the dependent variable (Final
State) can be predicted from the given set of independent variables. The specific value (0.62) shows that the model is a good fit
for the given data set.

enough data for the NPLs8 and the interbank exposure at the snapshot period (period 10, as mentioned earlier) are similar for banks which ended
up in the bankrupt and prosperous states, albeit
interbank exposure is somewhat higher for the
prosperous state.

Table 2 shows the coefficients for the variables in
the proposed prediction model, which are significant at the 95% confidence level. This regression
model has a satisfactory R–2 value and was implemented in the model in an effort to predict the
final state of the financial institution. Once the
prediction model was implemented, the simulaWith respect to the market position, it must be tions were executed 1,000 more times to verify ronoted that the simulations appear to suggest an bustness and the outcome (displayed in Table 3)
interest rate strategy for banks. The findings show was encouraging. On the snapshot period, the fithat offering lower interest rates, vis-à-vis the mar- nancial variables were calculated and used in conket average, both for deposits and for loans, will junction with the governance variables in order
improve the bank’s future, the particulars of the to compute a prediction for the bank’s final state.
prisoner’s dilemma notwithstanding. A lower in- The authors let the simulation complete and comterest rate spread is also advisable, as is the use of pared the predicted state to the actual final state.
a lower profit margin, even though the results are
Table 3. Robustness check of the prediction
not clear on the latter.
model over 1,000 simulations
A simple linear regression on the results shows
that the important variables are the presence of
the CRO in the board, the ownership variables
and the interest rate strategy variables. These were
included in the final prediction model.
It is not surprising that the public ownership variable does not exhibit high correlation, since, as
was shown earlier, its relationship with the final
state is not a linear one and consequently a linear
regression of these variables will fail to describe
the dependent variable’s values. Admittedly, the
use of a linear regression is simplistic and is one of
the shortcomings of the current work. However, as
one will see below, the linear regression is successful in describing the model and the resulting forecasting system can predict the bank’s final state
with a fair amount of certainty.
8

Non-Performing Loans.

102

Percentage,
%
Successful prediction

64.25

Unsuccessful prediction

35.75

Better state than predicted

57.98

Worse state than predicted

42.02

In most cases, the prediction model was successful
in forecasting the bank’s final state, since in only
35% of the simulations the prediction was false. In
these latter cases, only 42% would be damaging to
the investors, since the final state of the bank was
worse than the predicted one. Consequently, even
though one can argue that a prediction of a worse
state than the final one can also prove damaging,
only a mere 15% of predictions could make an investor or depositor worse off if they followed it.

Banks and Bank Systems, Volume 13, Issue 3, 2018

CONCLUSION
Concluding this paper, the authors have shown that both governance and financial variables need to be
taken into account when discussing bank viability and when predicting whether the bank has enough
potential to handle a financial crisis. The findings agree with the relevant literature, which places emphasis on the presence of a CRO in the board of directors, on board independence and on the ownership
structure of the financial institutions, when discussing bank performance and hence viability.
Additionally, the introduction of a low interest rate strategy is proposed, which needs further verification though, since it appears to be a case of prisoner’s dilemma. If all banks follow this strategy, then it
will simply be ineffective. Consequently, a bank will need to be careful when using this strategy as a tool
for better results.
The findings have also led to a simple, linear prediction model for the bank’s end state, but it must be
noted that the effectiveness is limited to the economic system of the agent-based model in its current
version. The model seems to fail to predict a worse-off final state in only 15% of cases.
The empirical results have some important policy implications. Banking supervision pays little importance to the corporate governance features of the financial institutions. Additionally, authorities seem to
focus more on capital requirements, which have been shown to hinder banking activity, with negative effects on the real economy and society. The results of the simulations suggest that regulators should take
into account management characteristics of each bank as well. Policy makers can use this information
to improve their stress testing systems in order to yield better results. The lack of statistical significance
for commonly quoted figures, such as the NPLs and the interbank exposure, implies that banking authorities need to evolve their models and include more characteristics which might not have been taken
previously into account. In today’s corporate environment, where the role of banks is not limited to financial services but extends to many aspects of the modern society, bank failure can have severe adverse
effects in community prosperity.
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